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Abstract: The defenders of deliberative democracy insist in the idea that for searching political truths 
is necessary to use values as universality, rationality and fairness. The defenders of the politics of identity 
distrust from this deliberative approach because, the interests of the powerful groups of the society are 
often behind those values. The common approach of deliberative democracy misunderstands the proper 
role, language, expression and actual interests of the members of the minorities.  
Deliberative democracy isn't really compromised with pluralism –social, cultural, ethnic, racial…– 
because it is more compromised with formal and substantial rules of decision that finally determine the 
result of the deliberation. Minorities claim for a new understanding of the democracy from the difference, 
from the identity. Thus, democracy is the result of a dialogue, not from abstractions, but from the 
particularity. In this sense, it is important the notion of ethics of alterity as a moral effort to understand 
the Other. This exercise excludes all kind of alterophobia (misogyny, xenophobia, racism, homophobia...) 
and it is against relativist approach. An identity is legitimate in the way it includes the alterity. The 
minorities claim to think, other time, topics as democracy from the dynamics between identity/alterity, 
inclusion/exclusion, equal dignity/differentiated identity.  
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I. ON DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
It could be said that there is now a ‘deliberative turn’.  In this respect, Dryzeck 
writes: “the final decade of the second millennium saw the theory of democracy take a 
strong deliberative turn” (Dryzeck 2000: p. 1).  The implications of these deliberative 
approaches are not yet quite clear, especially within the institutional domain.  
 
In recent literature, there are different conceptions of democracy that emphasize 
in more formal or substantial aspects. These conceptions have diverse views 
surrounding the role of the citizens, representatives and the objective of politics. These 
perspectives also have different philosophical backgrounds regarding concepts such as 
rationality, persuasion, interests, virtue and so on. 
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The current representative institutions are supported by a pluralist, liberal, 
aggregative or realist conception of democracy. There is a political market in which 
every option competes for voters in every election.  This vision is inspired in Social 
Choice Theory. The implications of this conception are that voters should search for 
their private interests in the political elections. In this line, Shumpeter, Dahl and Posner 
have defended some versions of the pluralist conception of democracy (Shumpeter 
1987) (Dahl 1989) (Posner 2003) 
 
There is an alternative vision that is called discursive or deliberative conception 
of democracy. Some authors have argued that it is needed to increase the deliberation 
and participation necessary for a democracy of quality. This view affirms that is 
possible to arrive at an agreement if the participants follow certain rules of public 
debate. In this position it is important that participants can persuade others and be 
persuaded by others. The final outcome is a product with the participation of all in equal 
conditions. There are some authors who have exposed these ideas, some of whom fall 
under the label of republicanism (Cohen 2002) (Gutman Thompson 2000) (Michaelman 
1998) (Sunstein 1987-1988) (Nino, 1996) (Dryzek 2000) (Bohman Rehg 2002)  (Pettit 
2001a). 
 
The proponents of deliberative democracy have exposed their views based on 
values and presuppositions, which are not always explicit and well discussed. There are 
implicit values and structures under the mechanisms of deliberative democracy.  
 
There is a line of criticism of deliberative democracy with regard to its treatment 
of minorities. Some positions have stressed that there are strong assumptions in 
deliberative models that, in some cases, exclude or undermine the views of minorities. 
The models of deliberative democracy are generally not sensitive to differences and, in 
some cases, seek to minimise differences in order to achieve the ideals of impartiality or 
common good.   
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the relationship between deliberative 
democracy and politics of identity. Some conflicts between them exist. However, 
politics of identity could be a way of improving deliberation for a more inclusive 
democracy based on, and not devoid of, differences. 
 
II. A VERSION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
There are several models of deliberative democracy. Most of them share some 
defining characteristics. Cohen outlines  some features of deliberative democracy:  
 
D1 A deliberative democracy is an on-going and independent 
association, whose members expect it to continue into the indefinite 
future. 
D2 The members of the association share (and it is common knowledge 
that they share) the view that the appropriate terms of association provide 
a framework for the results of their deliberation. For them, free 
deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy 
D3 A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. The members 
have diverse preferences, convictions and ideals concerning the conduct 
of their own lives.  
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D4 Because the members of a democratic association regard deliberative 
procedures as the source of legitimacy, it is important to them that terms 
of their association nor merely be the results of their deliberation, but 
also be manifest to them as such. They prefer institutions in which the 
connections between deliberation and outcomes are evident to those in 
which the connections are less clear. 
D5 The members recognize one another as having deliberative capacities, 
i.e. the capacities required for entering into public exchange of reasons 
and for acting on the result of such public reasoning (Cohen 2002: p. 
346). 
 
Under this perspective, Cohen explains the main principle of deliberative 
democracy: “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the 
object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen, 2002, 347). 
 
Developing this idea, Cohen exposes what are the conditions for deliberative 
democracy: 
 
I1 Ideal deliberation is free in that it satisfies two conditions. First, the 
participants regard themselves as bound only by results of their 
deliberation and by the preconditions for that deliberation. Their 
consideration of proposals is not constrained by the authority of prior 
norms and requirements. Second, the participants suppose that they can 
act from the results, taking the fact that a certain decision is arrived at 
through their deliberation is sufficient reason for complying with it. 
I2 Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties are required to state their 
reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them or criticizing them. 
They give reasons with the expectations that those reasons will settle the 
fate of their proposal.  
I3 In ideal deliberation, parties are both formally and substantively equal. 
Everyone with the deliberative capacities has equal standing at each stage 
of the deliberative process. The participants are substantively equal in 
that the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their 
chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an 
authoritative role in their deliberation. 
 
I4 Finally, ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated 
consensus  –to find reasons that are persuasive to all who committed to 
acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternative by 
equals (Cohen 2002: pp. 347-348). 
It seems that deliberative democracy has some conditions that guarantee 
the legitimacy of the process as freedom, reasoning, equality, consensus. 
But the point is that this vision quite often misrepresents the views of 
minorities and makes them almost invisible for the deliberation and final 
outcome.    
 
III. IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, RECOGNITION AND POLITICS 
 
During recent years, the relevance of identity has grown in both the Political 
Theory and political agendas of constitutional democracies. The discourse regarding 
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minorities has represented a challenge for some theoretical and practical approaches to 
politics. The questions of “Who am I?” “Where do I belong?” have become central 
aspects of some perspectives in public deliberations.   
 
This has been labelled as the ‘struggle for recognition’. In an influential essay, 
Taylor explains that there are two ideals, which are sometimes in conflict with each 
other. The first one is the equal dignity of all human beings. This entails politics of 
equality and non-discrimination, and is the common reading of Enlightenment heritage. 
But Taylor exposes that there is another relevant ideal, also with a universal basis:  the 
recognition of the differentiated identities of every human being. The relationships 
between the two ideals are complex and not always harmonious. In some cases, each 
ideal leads to a different solution.  
 
The ‘struggle for recognition’ means to move part of the political agenda from 
an ‘equal dignity’ ideal to a ‘differentiated identity’ ideal. This movement seems 
difficult in the context of deliberative democracy. As Goldstein and Rayner point out, 
“the negotiating process in identity disputes is often typified by denial and 
mystification, and its outcome is frequently ambiguous: no matter what I get (what 
interest are satisfied), I may continue to wonder if what I get really recognizes who I 
am” (Goldstein and Rayner 1994: p. 367). 
 
Based on this perspective, the question is ‘Who is included/excluded from the 
discussion?’ In her work Inclusion and Democracy, Young offers critiques of the 
deliberative democracy model from the perspective of minorities. She identifies 
exclusion as a problem of democracy, though in the deliberative model. Her vision 
denounces the subtle ways in which minorities fail to fully participate, express opinions 
or be influential or decisive. Young exposes that there are external and internal forms of 
exclusion in the deliberative model of democracy.   
 
External exclusion, Young explains, names the many ways that individuals and 
groups that ought to be included are purposely or inadvertently left out of fora for 
discussion and decision-making (Young 2002: pp. 53-54). This is subtle because 
democracy usually speaks the language of equality and inclusion, but at the same time 
this also means an implicit mechanism of exclusion. 
 
The values of political culture and media messages are dominated by powerful 
groups within society. Effective access to media and real political participation by 
minorities is discouraged by the dominant groups.  Consequently, difficulties in 
participating are encountered by individuals who are members of a minority. For 
Young, the most pervasive and insidious form of external exclusion is the ability of 
economically or socially powerful groups to exercise political domination (Young 2002: 
p. 54). 
 
This means that politics is conceived as the territory of the dominant groups or, 
more exactly, the territory of the ideas and values of the dominant groups. Young 
argues that it is not simply a question of exclusion of ideas but rather a matter of modes 
of expression.  This is related to internal exclusion, which Young defines as the ways in 
which people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when 
they have access to fora and decision-making procedures (Young 2002: p. 55). 
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The argument from politics of identity, as Gutmann explains, is “what counts as 
reasonable or unreasonable for matter of social justice cannot be specified 
independently of social understandings” (Gutmann 1993: p. 201). It could be a social 
understanding from a politics of identity of what is reasonable in a specific case. Or it is 
quite clear that the social understanding under majority values of reasonability 
undermines minority perspectives. 
 
The model of deliberative democracy affirms the view that deliberation ensures 
a fair result. However, sometimes this is not true in an inclusive deliberation, but rather 
in a predesigned outcome. It is implicit in the deliberative model that consensus on 
uniform rules is always hypothetically possible (Wheatley 2003: p. 518). This 
consensus is based on some ontological, philosophical or political notions that have 
strong meaning and implications from the minority members’ perspectives. 
 
Young suggests that, in circumstances of social and economic inequality 
between groups, the definition of the common good often devalues or excludes some of 
the legitimate frameworks of thinking, interest, and priorities in the polity. A common 
consequence of social privilege is the ability of a group to convert its perspective on 
some issues into accepted authoritative knowledge without being challenged by those 
who have reason to see things differently (Young 1997: p. 399) 
 
Under the question about the forms of deliberation, some kind of implicit 
political and social exclusion is underlined. Young states that the label ‘articulateness’ 
privileges the modes of expression typical of highly educated people. Those who exhibit 
such articulate qualities of expression are usually socially privileged (Young 2002: p. 
38-39). In this sense, Young affirms “disorderly, disruptive, annoying, or distracting 
means of communication are often necessary or effective elements in such efforts to 
engage others in debate over issues and outcomes” (Young 2002: p. 50). 
 
Implicit in this view is the idea of the covert exclusion of the views of the 
minorities, imposing a norm of order in political deliberation. Sometimes minorities 
express their views as a part of a social protest or with demonstrations or activist 
actions. These are also part of politics according to social needs. In the view of Young, 
“I aim to challenge the identification of reasonable open public debate with polite, 
orderly, dispassionate, gentlemanly argument” (Young 2002: p. 49). 
 
IV. A MORE INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
The criticism made in support of politics of identity towards deliberative 
democracy claims that democracy must mean more inclusion in the public sphere. 
Basically, the criticism is that the model of deliberative democracy is an implicit form 
of exclusion of the views, values and forms of expressions of the minorities. There is 
some tendency to erase differences by appealing to such ideals as impartiality, 
reasonability, universality and common good. But these ideals could have a negative 
result for minorities. 
 
Part of the battle for a more inclusive democracy is the recognition of the 
differences (or social perspectives, to use Young’s term). Democracy, then, is not 
synonymous with the elimination of differences, but rather democracy comes from 
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differences from a ‘situated self’. Under this perspective, Young describes conditions 
for an inclusive democracy: 
 
a) Plurality of perspectives motivates claimants to express their proposals as 
appeals to justice rather than expressions of mere self-interest or preference;  
b) Confrontation with different perspectives, interests, and cultural meanings 
teaches individuals the partiality of their own, and reveals to them their own experience 
as perspectival;  
c) Expressing, questioning, and challenging differently situated knowledge adds 
to social knowledge. While not abandoning their own perspectives, people who listen 
across differences come to understand something about the ways that proposals and 
policies affect others differently situated. (Young 1997: pp. 402-403) 
 
There are some tensions between deliberative democracy and politics of identity, 
but both want to improve the quality of public decisions. To study these tensions, 
several issues are analysed: a) Incommensurability argument; b) Civilizing force of 
hypocrisy; c) Ethics of alterity; d) Politics of ideas v. Politics of presence 
 
IV.1. Incommensurability argument 
 
There is an important metaethical classification of moral truths which 
distinguishes between monism, pluralism and relativism. Beyond relativism, there are 
no moral intrasubjetive values –in the strong sense– or there are moral values only 
within a society or culture –in the weak sense. Beyond monism, there is a unique 
hierarchy of moral values for every case, of which human beings can be aware. Beyond 
pluralism, there are moral values, but they are objectively plural. They are in conflict, in 
the sense of incommensurability (Perez de la Fuente 2005). 
 
The real structure of values, for pluralism, is complex, agonistic, and 
sophisticated. This means that some times, theory has epistemic limits to compare one 
value to another. This view was defended by Berlin. The consequence is that politics is 
conceived as conflict rather than unanimity. An application of this view is the proposal 
of agonistic democracy by Mouffe.   
 
The force behind this argument for deliberative democracy is showing the 
implicit methaetical premise on moral values behind some models. These are closer to a 
monist conception that for every case there is only one right solution. But it is possible 
to defend a methaetical premise of value pluralism.  The intuition of this second view 
better reflects the complex reality and supposes a better outcome for minorities. 
 
The argument of value pluralism is an interesting point, but it also has some 
dangers. The main problem is confusing value pluralism with relativism, in the strong 
or weak sense. In the first case, it would not be appropriate to interpret that what value 
pluralism means for deliberative democracy is something similar to anything goes. This 
means that, for pluralism, there are moral values, and deliberation could be a good 
means to find them. The issue is that the answer could be more complex than for 
monism. 
 
In the second case, relativism in a weak sense, it is important to properly 
distinguish between moral incommensurability with cultural incommensurability. While 
Oscar Pérez de la Fuente 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 1 (2013) 
41 
 
the difficulties of comparing art works from different cultures is familiar, it is clear that 
radical cultural incommensurability means that it is impossible to morally judge the 
values of a culture outside of them. Value pluralism does not negate universality, but 
surely it is a more complex universal conception of monism. 
 
The incommensurability argument supports the belief that deliberation has a 
theory behind it. This might seem obvious, but it is a more general reflection on the role 
of Theory and Practice in the philosophical approach. If Theory always gives the 
solution, deliberation becomes useless. If deliberation ought to arrive at the answer that 
is derived from existing Theory, the actual deliberation has minimal real importance. If 
the outcome of an deliberation is always judged by its correspondence to theoretical, 
predetermined values, deliberation as a process to finding moral truths is implicitly 
discounted and devalued.4 
 
Following Cohen, “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they 
could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 2002: p. 
347). How does incommensurability thesis concord with this statement?  
 
A monist presupposes that he knows the truth and the way to achieve it. If he has 
a coherent reasoning, he also thinks that others can achieve it and if they don’t, they are 
mistaken. A monist vision of deliberative democracy could be understood as a 
collective way to arrive at the truth. Under this perspective, ‘consensus’ is accompanied 
by resounding words such as impartiality, universality and so on However, if the final 
outcome do not coincide with the monist’s ‘truth’, then for him deliberative democracy 
is mistaken and he denies its validity. It is the domain of tolerance –or the second-best 
preferences.  
 
Underlying this is the view that there are two sources of legitimacy for truth. 
The first one is the monist view, with its way of arriving at the truth. The second one is 
the process of deliberative democracy to arrive at an agreement. The two views do not 
necessarily coincide. A monist who deliberates must be capable of being persuaded by 
others’ arguments, but as such he is being incoherent with his particular truth. 
 
It seems that deliberative democracy needs to compromise with some premise of 
value pluralism. If a person thinks that deliberation improves the outcome and the 
quality of democracy, that person, to be coherent, should hold that values are plural and 
objective. This means that democracy is conceived as a struggle between differing 
views all of which are valid. In consequence, democracy is something agonistic, as a 
tragedy, as a dilemma… In this context, deliberative democracy could be a good tool 
for every option to expose these views and better arguments. Deliberation could be 
something decisive, in pragmatic terms.  
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Monism and value pluralism offer different relationships between theory and 
practice. Monism has strong theoretical content and is averse to forgoing it. Then 
deliberative democracy can confirm its views or, if not, democracy is mistaken.  Value 
pluralism is a pragmatic option. There is no theoretical answer to the question if a value 
is better than another. Then the solution could be a deliberation to search the best 
arguments. 
 
Generally speaking, monist views –near universality and impartiality– are less 
responsive to minorities’ claims than value pluralism. Describing values as coherent and 
harmonic usually uncover the majority’s interests and values. Describing values and 
democracy as competitive and in struggle usually reflects better the vision of minorities. 
 
IV.2. Civilizing force of hypocrisy 
 
One of the theoretical elements behind deliberative democracy models is human 
nature. The first relevant notion is rationality understood as individual self-interest, 
sometimes expressed as maximization of utility. The second notion is reasonability 
understood as the individual capacity of a moral sense of justice. This is commonly 
interpreted that, at times, some relevant considerations of justice suppose a 
renouncement of individual self-interest. 
 
The aggregative model of democracy has human beings as rational and self-
interested. The deliberative model of democracy has human beings as rational and 
reasonable. This second approach is developed in Rawls’ works. In the model of 
deliberative democracy, one can be persuaded by the reason of others and can change 
his or her preferences. He or she can be sensible to arguments, not only self-interest. 
 
In an interesting work, Elster has defended the civilizing force of hypocrisy in 
deliberative contexts. He analyses two constitutional assemblies and focuses on two 
activities in the assemblies: debating and bargaining. He emphasizes the strategic use of 
impartial arguments and compares them with the bargaining alternative. Elster then 
summarizes his argument in four steps: 
 
1.- There are real penalties attached to naked assertion of self-interest. 
2.- Impartial claims that correspond perfectly to self-interest will in fact be 
perceived as naked assertions of self-interest. 
3.- Because it may be difficult to decide whether a claim corresponds perfectly 
or imperfectly to self-interest, the second premise is necessarily more shaky. 
4.- Sometimes the need to adopt an arguing rather than bargaining stance makes 
a difference (Elster 2000: p. 421). 
 
The conclusion in Elster’s view is that it is better to adopt an impartial argument 
if it is a part of a strategy, rather than bargaining. This supposes that the translation of 
the claims to the language of justice, even strategically, based on self-interest, could 
work in favour of the weak. This is a good point but it could potentially be interesting to 
explore consequences from the perspective of minorities.     
 
In order to understand the civilizing force of hypocrisy, it is relevant to appeal to 
Rawls’ notion of duty of civility. He defines it as: “the ideal of citizenship imposes a 
moral, not a legal, duty –the duty of civility– to be able to explain to one another on 
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those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for 
can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty also involves a 
willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations 
to their views should be reasonably be made” (Rawls 1993: p. 217). 
 
If deliberative democracy searches for the best argument, there is a need to 
justify each person’s own claims in terms acceptable to all. The translation from 
interests to justice, from rationality to reasonability is, according to Elster, a bit 
hypocritical, but preferable to bargaining.     
 
From the minorities’ approach, Elster’s argument could be interpreted in 
different terms. The strategic use of impartiality in deliberation by majority members 
could be brought into question when it corresponds clearly to their self-interest. 
Essentially, the denouncing aspect of the politics of identity approach is that majority 
values are seen as neutral and normal, but minority values are seen as inferior and 
deviant. When the majority uses impartial arguments in deliberative democracy 
situations, they could be defending their own values.  
 
The minorities have, roughly speaking, two alternatives: also to be hypocritical 
or to denounce the strategic use of the argument. The first possibility implies 
constructing impartial arguments that in fact coincide with minority members’ interests. 
This leads to difficulty when the difference is perceived as a stigma, as multiculturalism 
denounces. Minority arguments need then a special kind of justification that could come 
from a meta-impartiality level, or could mean, as a condition for impartiality, the 
recognition of differences. 
 
The second possibility is to denounce that, behind the impartiality arguments of 
majority members, there might exist a strategic use because it in fact coincides with the 
majority’s self-interest. The point made by Elster is that the use of impartiality 
arguments could be beneficial for the weak. In these situations, minority members have 
to determine whether an impartial argument is good for their interests and identities. 
They can then accept the argument or construct a better argument according to their 
views. 
   
The force of the best argument is still better than the force of bargaining. This 
might be particularly clear for minorities due to social inequality and unequal 
distribution of political power. Usually minority members have little bargaining power. 
There may potentially be some exceptions.  
 
There is a somewhat pessimistic point in Elster’s argument that brings up a kind 
of sophistic approach. Sophism teaches citizens in Athens polis to convince using 
argument in order to defeat rivals, without special moral considerations. The point is 
that if the deliberative democracy model is an exercise in hypocrisy and every 
participant only in fact searches based on their self-interest, deliberation could mean a 
kind of disguise for interests with arguments.  
  
This is not necessarily bad from a minority members’ perspective if they use 
arguments that are based on their interest and identities to achieve justice, and make 
strategic use of the strategic utilization of impartial arguments made by majority 
members. 
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IV.3. Ethics of alterity 
 
In a globalized world, the discourse surrounding identities must be adapted to 
new realities. There is a discussion between cosmopolitan and nationalist visions that 
has different dimensions. Both sides have good arguments.  I defend the view that the 
best way to understand cosmopolitanism is as moral virtue (Perez de la Fuente 2006b) 
This cosmopolitan virtue has two elements: a) Ethics of alterity; b) Redefinition of 
solidarity connections. 
 
The ethics of alterity is inspired by the works of Aranguren and Levinas. This 
view is in opposition to both relativism and any form of alterophobia (misogyny, 
racism, xenophobia, homophobia, antiSemitism …). It is based on the notion of 
reciprocity under the golden rule of humanity: do to others as you would have them do 
to you. This golden rule is reflected in the norms of several religions.  
 
The main point of the ethics of alterity is that an identity will be legitimate 
within the conditions of inclusion of its alterity. This does not mean renouncing ones 
own values, but rather seriously undertaking the task of understanding the other 
individual and learning from the differences. This should be considered an ethical 
exercise.  This moral attitude has been called as positive tolerance by Thiebaut and 
Eusebio Fernandez (Thieubaut 1999: p. 59) (Fernandez Garcia 1995: p. 98) 
 
The adequate development of ethics of alterity could be a good mechanism for 
improving deliberative democracy. There is an insistence on the relevance of identity, 
but it could be interesting to turn to the relevance of alterity. This is particularly useful 
in deliberative contexts. In English, there is an interesting expression: putting yourself 
in someone else’s shoes. It precisely reflects the exercise of adopting the other’s point of 
view. The point in ethics of alterity is that we can learn from this exercise and it is, 
indeed, a positive ethical exercise. 
 
In an inclusive democracy of deliberation, the ethics of alterity would be a way 
of convincing the majority to change the stigmatizing meaning of difference. Story 
telling by minorities would be a way of sharing experiences of oppression, 
discrimination, and marginalization as a part of a day-to-day understanding of their 
situations. 
 
It would also serve to demonstrate the impact of some majority-held –apparently 
neutral– values on the minority’s situation. This is essentially the exercise of 
recognizing the differences as morally relevant. This is the first step towards accepting 
their claims as legitimate and for achieving the political empowerment of minorities. 
 
It is possible to think that ethics of alterity for deliberative democracy is a naive 
vision. One of the premises for deliberation is that individuals are capable of being 
persuaded by the reasons and visions of others. If individuals only follow their own 
self-interest, they do not really want to deliberate for real; instead, they bargain. The 
purpose of ethics of alterity is to try to legitimately understand the reasons of others and 
learn from this. 
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V. POLITICS OF PRESENCE V. POLITICS OF IDEAS 
 
One interesting point on the minority’s perspective is the approach, defended by 
Phillips, on the necessity of a politics of presence in the decision-making process 
(Phillips 1995). This means that the outcome of a deliberation depends upon who 
participates in arriving at the decision. The composition of assemblies is not so neutral 
as might be supposed; it influences the decision-making process. Then politics of 
presence requires that representatives of the minority be part of the organs that decide. 
For example, the policy of quotas for women in politics. Or, more recently, the claim 
for equality amongst both sexes in a democracy. 
 
This question is polemic, especially in political contexts. There are well known 
arguments for and against reverse discrimination, which are commonly repeated. It is 
relevant to note that an important claim made by minorities is a collective right of 
representation as a minority. This means being represented as a minority in Government 
organs. This is the case of indigenous representatives in Latin American parliaments.   
 
In a deliberative democracy context, it would mean the necessity of plurality in 
the composition of fora, or channels of participation whereby members of minorities 
must be included. Minorities must be included not only when the decision affects them 
directly but also in all decisions regardless of their impact on them.  
 
The presence of other visions, especially those of minority groups, is a good 
condition for ethics of alterity. Otherwise, some neutral and impartial members decide 
based on supposing how the other might think or what would be in the other’s best 
interest This is clear for example when a Supreme Court decides a case on abortion 
without any women amongst the judges who hear and decide the case.  
 
However, the politics of presence has its weak points. The presence of a member 
of a minority does not guarantee that he or she will defend the interests or perspectives 
of the minority. This is related to the question of essentialization of identities. There are 
relevant differences between minorities. There are multiple identities amongst 
minorities and the individual self-definition incorporates various levels.  
 
Another weak point is the application of the dilemma of difference. When the 
image, language or claims of the minority group instead have an emancipatory 
interpretation a connotation of emancipation from dominant-held views, it reinforces the 
tendency of the majority to stigmatise and belittle the minority. The question then is 
whether, to arrive at a more inclusive democracy, there should be a change to the rules 
of ‘political correctness’: accepting the difference as a usual part of the political agenda 
and considering ridicule and depreciation of minority speech as suspicious. 
 
Although this vision may have weak points, the conclusion is that it might be 
necessary to  combine the politics of ideas and the politics of presence. Minorities must 
be represented in decision-making. It is also true that the majority can, in an exercise 
similar to ethics of alterity, learn to appreciate adequately the view of others. The key 
point is that the presence of minority members in decision-making organs can facilitate 
satisfactory democracy in the process. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
 
Democracy must speak the language of inclusion. However, there are some 
implicit rules and values that serve to exclude the views of minorities. Deliberative 
democracy and politics of identity both seek to improve the quality of public decision-
making. They both search for a more just society, yet the two visions in some aspects 
are contradictory. 
 
There are ontological, philosophical and political issues with both approaches 
that are usually not analysed. The interrelation between deliberation and identities is not 
commonly analysed due to the tendencies of individualism and assimilation.  The 
weight of the fundamental view in deliberative democracy models that the way to attain 
the common good is to minimise differences has led to this absence of analysis.   
 
The challenge is to develop a deliberative democracy model that is more 
inclusive yet embraces and accommodates difference. Politics, then, is not the domain 
of unity or unanimous decisions, but rather the sphere of struggle, value pluralism and 
confrontation. This does not mean there is not a solution, but it is potentially plural and 
agonistic. The outcome must incorporate all relevant social perspectives and suppose an 
ethics of alterity exercise.  
 
The incommensurability argument is relevant for minorities because the 
emphasis on monism is behind some deliberative democracy models. The monist 
unique hierarchy of moral values usually corresponds to majority values, considered as 
normal and neutral. Behind values such as impartiality or reasonability, there is a subtle 
form of exclusion of the views of minorities.  
 
Under the civilizing force of hypocrisy argument, there is an interesting view on 
the strategic use of argument in deliberative contexts. The point is that, instead of 
deliberation developing in terms of reasonability or impartiality, in fact every 
participant is calculating interests and using strategies. Minorities must be on their 
guard against this strategic use of argument by the majority and need to devise the best 
counter strategy in deliberation. 
 
Deliberating just solutions for social problems, in an inclusive way, needs both 
to get away from identities and to develop an ethic exercise based upon ethics of 
alterity. This supposes deliberation must incorporate all relevant social perspectives and 
must learn from the inclusion of alterity in terms of reciprocity. This excludes relativism 
and all forms of alterophobia. The main ethical issue is the relationship with the Other 
and there is a great learning on this. The rules and values of deliberative democracy 
need to adopt adequately the argument of ethics of alterity. 
 
Minorities must defend with moderation the politics of presence.  Whilst there 
are also a few dangers with this view, It generally shows positive points with respect to 
the minority. The best solution is a combination between the politics of presence and the 
politics of ideas. It is easy to perform an ethics of alterity exercise if the minorities are 
present in the deliberative organ. But it is also true that this presence does not 
necessarily guarantee the outcome, and it is possible for majority members alone to 
perform this ethical exercise. Obviously, the politics of presence facilitate this.  
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A definition of democracy, from classical origin, says it is the government of 
‘free and equal’ citizens. Although there is an emancipatory meaning on these 
democratic ideals, from its origins, democracy is also synonymous with exclusion of 
women, foreigners and slaves. The different forms of exclusion have changed, but 
persist in several ways. The point is that deliberative democracy models have a 
tendency of privileging some points of view and types of arguments, and excluding 
minority members’ perspectives. The improvement of collective decision-making 
requires a more inclusive concept of democracy. 
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